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ABSTRACT 
 
The data subject’s (or the individual to whom the data relates) right to erasure under 
the new EU’s data protection law is likely to cause tensions with the right to 
freedom of expression. Using Article 17(1)(d)-(e) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation as a nexus to trigger and apply the right to privacy in EU law to the right 
to erasure, this Note presents a balancing test of four factors that can be used to 
consistently determine whether individual cases that request a right to erasure for 
published material are entitled to privacy protections. The proposed balancing test 
“Elements of Erasure” asks the following questions regarding the published 
information: whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether there 
was a reasonable expectation of a duty of confidence, how the information was 
collected, and whether an individual is personally identifiable using the disclosed 
information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Should individuals have the right to ask Google or a local newspaper to 
erase pictures, descriptions, or audio of themselves in certain circumstances? 
Should individuals feel differently about unflattering pictures taken after winning 
their elementary school’s spelling bee or pictures of them partying on spring break? 
What rights do individuals have regarding pornographic videos of themselves 
posted online? Should their rights differ if the pornographic material is revenge 
porn? Should individuals be able to erase their mugshots after they got arrested for 
public intoxication in college? What if the information posted online relates to the 
number of steps an individual took one day and posted online through a health 
tracker, and then subsequently found the information displayed on an unrelated 
blog post? Should the individual have a right to remove the information from being 
displayed to the public?  
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Assume that an individual witnessed a crime in public and their picture was 
plastered all over the news. Should that individual have legal protections to prevent 
the images from being displayed although the individual is only in the pictures’ 
background and saw the photographers? Would individuals generally feel 
differently about pictures of their toddlers being published globally? What if an 
individual’s famous long-term ex is detailing everything humiliating the individual 
has done in an autobiography, does it matter if a pseudonym is used for the person’s 
name? What about publishing a private conversation an individual had in public?  
Privacy laws are rapidly emerging and developing, yet remain a relatively 
unstructured area of law with vast global disparities in both legislation and common 
law.2 The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), coming 
into force in mid-2018, will radically change the data privacy climate. Article 17 of 
the GDPR, the right to erasure (RTE), which is synonymous with the right to be 
forgotten (RTBF) for this Note’s purposes, allows the erasure of personal data 
under specific circumstances.3 Article 17 is often considered vague or unclear in 
certain aspects, particularly when it conflicts with the right to freedom of 
expression. This Note aims to clarify, based on international law, common law, and 
notions of privacy, when privacy should prevail over the right to free expression, 
justifying an individual’s right to erasure.  
This Note generates a balancing test that will be termed “elements of erasure 
(EOE).” This test proposes factors courts and practitioners can use to evaluate and 
allow or deny an Article 17 RTE request when individuals request the erasure of 
published “private information” and the cases do not explicitly fall under the clear 
circumstances that warrant or prevent erasure in sub-articles (1)(a)-(e)4 or when the 
cases may conflict with sub-article(3)(a)5. These factors list the relevant elements 
                                                 
2 Compare UAE Federal Decree-law no.5/2012 dated 13/08/2012 AD On Combating 
Cybercrimes, http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/cybercrimes_5_2012_en.pdf, with 
Laws of Malaysia, Act 709, Personal Data Protection Act 2010, 
http://www.pdp.gov.my/images/LAWS_OF_MALAYSIA_PDPA.pdf (contrasting UAE and 
Malaysian privacy laws that protect varying interests); Jackson Lewis PC, Alabama Senates 
Passes Data Breach Notification Act, Lexology (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9e5a0747-faa9-4400-95fc-d5ffe4891d05, and 
Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82 (amended by Stats. 2016, Ch. 337, Sec. 2. (AB 2828)), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=
1798.82 (contrasting the large disparities in state data breach notification laws). 
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
OJ 2016 L 119/1. [hereinafter GDPR], https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679.  
4 Id. at art. 17(1)(a)-(e). 
5 Id. at art. 17(3)(a). 
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of privacy in the context of publishing personal information and freedom of 
expression, and aim to clarify which information is considered private under the 
right to erasure, thus permitting its erasure under the GDPR’s RTE in accordance 
with the European Charter of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union. The EOE conceptualize elements of privacy by analyzing 
English common law, cases decided by courts including the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and 
various scholars’ arguments and theories.6  
Part II of this Note discusses background information including an 
influential case, the Data Protection Directive, the GDPR and Article 17, EU laws 
pertaining to the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Part II also 
discusses the meaning of privacy and provides the necessary background to build a 
foundation for the “elements of erasure.” Part III discusses unresolved ambiguities 
within the GDPR, examines tensions between the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to privacy, analyzes data privacy court decisions, and presents the 
balancing test coined, “elements of erasure,” to assess RTE requests 
comprehensively and ensure individual privacy protections and control of personal 
data and information without stifling the freedom of expression and information.  
A few important notes regarding the topic and scope of this Note: 1) This 
Note rests on the assumption that the RTE should be based on the right to privacy 
in EU law as implied in Article 17(1)(d)-(e); 2) when discussing erasure, this Note 
refers to the simple erasure of data: the technical delisting, delinking, or removal of 
data being displayed; 3) the EOE aim to provide a solution for individual cases with 
Article 17 requests that do not neatly fall under Article 17(1)(a)-(c),(f) and 17(3)(b)-
(e) which state clear circumstances that warrant erasure such as withdrawal of 
consent or clear circumstances that prohibit erasure such as established public 
interest purposes or legal obligations; and 4) the EOE do not discuss nor consider 
cases with Article 17 requests as a result of the publication of mass data and private 
information or data breaches. 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
                                                 
6 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 67 (2008) (stating that a theory of privacy should 
be pluralistic, should be general but not too vague, and should accommodate the dynamic nature 
of privacy while maintaining widespread applicability. A theory of privacy, therefore, should 
consist of a framework for identifying the plurality of things that fall under the rubric of privacy. 
The framework must be concrete, but not so context-specific as to prevent wide application.)  
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In a landmark case against Google Spain, a man successfully sued Google 
to remove an unfavorable link concerning himself, an outcome that changed the 
way we perceive the role of search engines in our society. This case has 
implications on privacy and the freedom of information in general, and in 
particular, stirs the debate on whether, and if so when, individuals can request the 
removal of personal information from the public realm. This section delves into the 
details of Google Spain v. AEPD to better understand the implications of the 
decision on the RTE, the laws the case was based on; the EU Data Protection 
Directive, the GDPR and Article 17, followed by an explanation of EU privacy and 
freedom of expression laws. Different understandings and conceptualizations of 
privacy culminate this section.  
 
A. Google Spain v. AEPD 
 
In 2014, a Spanish citizen prevailed in his complaint against a Spanish daily 
newspaper, Google Inc., and Google Spain after a portion of his complaint sought 
to remove or alter pages that depicted a forced real-estate auction as a result of 
attachment proceedings from social security debts.7 He argued that the pages were 
irrelevant given that the proceedings were resolved.8 The CJEU outlined features 
that were used to assess the data’s compatibility with the directive9 and considered 
the interference of this information with elements of his private life,10 “the 
legitimate interest of internet users potentially interested in having access to that 
information,” “the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the 
data subject’s private life,” “the role played by the data subject in private life,” 
whether the data is relevant or not, and whether the data was “excessive in relation 
to the purposes for which they were processed.”11 Ultimately, the court ruled that 
the RTBF may apply even when data has been lawfully processed if the data is 
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those 
                                                 
7 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 93. 
8 Id. at ¶ 15. 
9 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive], 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=EN.  
10 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 70/14, Judgment in Case C-131/12 
(2014), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140070en.pdf 
(stressing that “the effect of the interference with the person’s rights is heightened on account of 
the important role played by the internet and search engines in modern society”). 
11 Id. 
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purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.”12 The court also explained 
that the RTBF is not an absolute right and must be weighed against other legitimate 
interests and rights.13  
Although the court ruled that Google, as an internet search engine, should 
comply with requests to remove private information that meets the standards the 
court outlined, the court did not order the newspaper to remove the information 
too.14 This element has perplexed scholars, and has not been explained by the court 
other than stating that it was published lawfully.15 The court also stated that the 
search engine’s activities include collecting, retrieving, recording, organizing, 
storing, and disclosing data, which makes the search engine a data controller.16 As 
a data controller, Google is subject to the Data Protection Directive (the Directive) 
(the current EU data protection law that precedes the GDPR), meaning that the 
court effectively ruled that the search engine operator must comply with the 
Directive and remove the personal information from the search results as requested 
by the data subject.17 This was a highly controversial decision which lead to 
widespread debates over the right to be forgotten and its effect on the freedom of 
expression.18 
While this decision was heavily applauded, it was also widely criticized and 
viewed as a restriction to the freedom of speech and expression. One way to phrase 
the CJEU ruling is by saying it has “interpreted the Directive as creating a 
presumption that Google must delete links to personal information from search 
results at the request of a data subject unless a strong public interest suggests 
                                                 
12 Google Spain SL v. AEPD, at ¶ 93. 
13 Id. at ¶ 86.  
14 See id.; The Right to Be Forgotten (Google v. Spain), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION 
CENTER (Apr. 7, 2018), https://epic.org/privacy/right-to-be-forgotten; see also Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 128 HARV. L. REV. 735 (Dec. 10, 2014) [hereinafter 
Google Spain], http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/google_spain_sl_v_agencia_espanola_de_proteccion_de_datos.pdf.  
15 Google Spain, at 736. See generally David Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia Carter, The 
Right to Obscurity: How We Can Implement the Google Spain Decision,17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 437 
(2016), http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1302&context=ncjolt 
(analyzing the application of this opinion and explaining that it does not result in “forgetting” any 
of the information, but obscuring the information). 
16 Google Spain SL v. AEPD, at ¶ 28. 
17 Google Spain, at 735. 
18 See Alan Travis & Charles Arthur, EU court backs ‘right to be forgotten’: Google must amend 
results on request, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-court-google-
search-results (highlighting EU justice commissioner Viviane Reding’s support for the court’s 
decision); see also Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html (arguing 
that the court’s decision is both too broad and too narrow and is a form of censorship).  
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otherwise.”19 Critics argue that this interpretation places too much power and 
control of public information in the hands of private entities, arguing that the court 
interpreted the Directive incorrectly when they broadened the interpretation of a 
data controller and found Google to be a controller, not a processor, based on 
having a search algorithm, although the search engine does not produce and publish 
its own content.20 This case also raises questions regarding the scope of data 
controllers’ legal and ethical responsibility in controlling information, and the 
excessive requests of erasure that are likely to arise given that the data subject may 
object to the display of their data even if the data is not prejudicial.21 Another 
criticism is that the court prioritizes privacy rights which limits access to 
information and allows individuals to impede such access without providing 
adequate protections to the public interest and freedom of expression.22 Despite 
these valid criticisms and an unclear opinion by the CJEU, the court’s decision that 
prioritizes privacy rights and grants power to data controllers stems from Article 7 
and Article 8 of the Charter,23 and the Directive which states that “it shall be for the 
controller to ensure that [principles relating to data quality including fair, lawful, 
accurate, and relevant processing and collection] is complied with.” 24  
 
B. EU Data Protection Directive 
 
The Google Spain case was based on the EU Data Protection Directive 
(Directive 95/46/EC) Articles 12 (b) and 14 (a),25 however, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) will supersede Directive 95/46/EC.26 The GDPR 
was approved by the EU Parliament on April 14, 2016 and will come into effect on 
May 25, 2018.27 The GDPR aims to “harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, 
                                                 
19 Google Spain, at 735.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7-8, 2010 O.J. (C 83/02), 
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 
24 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 6. 
25 Id.; See Margaret Rouse, EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC), WHATIS, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/EU-Data-Protection-Directive-Directive-95-46-EC (last 
updated January 2008) (stating that “the EU Data Protection Directive is based on 
recommendations proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)”); See also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), The OECD Privacy 
Framework (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf.  
26 EU GDPR.ORG, https://www.eugdpr.org/ [https://perma.cc/52MU-CTMR] (last visited October 
21, 2018). 
27 Id. 
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to protect and empower all EU citizens data privacy and reshape the way 
organizations across the region approach data privacy.”28 The origins of data 
privacy laws in the EU stem from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, which advanced principles for the protection of personal 
data and the right of privacy.29 
 
C. GDPR and the Right to Erasure  
 
As seen in EU case law and Directive 95/46/EC, the RTBF or RTE is not a 
novel concept. Additionally, the GDPR dedicates an entire Article to the concept 
“right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’),” further clarifying and expanding its role 
in EU privacy law. However, many elements and sections of the law remain 
unclear, and more questions arise when we analyze the practical implications of 
this Article.30 The full text of Article 17 of the GDPR, titled “Right to erasure (‘right 
to be forgotten’)” is provided at the end of this Note in Appendix A. 
 
D. EU Privacy and Freedom of Expression Laws 
 
Privacy laws and freedom of expression laws are not opposing forces in all 
circumstances; privacy laws are often necessary to protect an individual’s freedom 
of expression. However, RTE requests may be argued to have a chilling effect on 
the freedom of expression and information. To reach a recommendation that 
achieves to balance both interests, which will be presented in the analysis section, 
EU privacy laws and freedom of expression laws are delved into below.  
 
1. Privacy Laws  
                                                 
28 Id.  
29 See EU GDPR.ORG, How Did We Get Here? An Overview of Important Regulatory Events 
Leading up to the GDPR, https://eugdpr.org/the-process/how-did-we-get-here/ 
[https://perma.cc/GAF5-YAAJ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (listing the OECD’s proposed 
principles for protecting personal information: (1) Collection Limitation Principle; (2) Data 
Quality Principle; (3) Purpose Specification Principle; (4) Use Limitation Principle; (5) Security 
Safeguards Principle; (6) Openness Principle; (7) Individual Participation Principle; and (8) 
Accountability Principle.); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS 2017 255-56 (2017) [hereinafter SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS 2017] (explaining additional concepts the OECD added to the original eight key 
principles in 2013 which include national privacy strategies, privacy management programs, and 
data security breach notification). 
30 See infra Section III. 
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Although an underdeveloped area of the law, privacy law is more advanced 
in Europe than elsewhere in the world. Even prior to the GDPR, the right to privacy 
has an indisputable place in EU law, unlike the United States’ constitutional right 
to free speech which is more likely to trump the right to privacy.31 Most notably, 
individuals have certain privacy rights under the law. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (the Charter), Article 7 states that “[e]veryone has 
the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications,”32 and Article 8 states that “[e]veryone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning him of her,” and that “[s]uch data must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right 
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to 
have it rectified.”33 The Google Spain decision hinged on the Charter as the court 
stated that the data subject may request the erasure of his information based on 
Articles 7 and 8, and states that those rights override both the economic interest of 
the search engine and the interest of the general public in having access to the 
information.34 The court then stated that the exception to this protection is when the 
role played by the data subject in public life justifies the preponderant interest of 
the general public having access to the information.35 
Furthermore, the first legally binding treaty addressing data privacy is the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data, known as the Council of Europe Convention on Privacy.36 It is a 
non-self-executing treaty to which forty-six countries have acceded, and requires 
signatory nations to create data protection legislation that provides safeguards for 
processing personal information that achieve the minimum levels of protection 
specified in the convention.37 Finally, Article 8 of the European Convention on 
                                                 
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”). 
32 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 22, at art. 7. 
33 Id. at art. 8.  
34 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 99. 
35 Id. 
36 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108, https://rm.coe.int/1680078b37 [https://perma.cc/P8RG-
ZRPA]; see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 259. 
37 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 259-60 
(noting the importance of Article 5 of the Convention on “data quality” and its relevance to 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPs), the authors state: “In its broadest sense, data 
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Human Rights (the Convention) titled “right to respect for private and family life” 
states that everyone has the right to private family life, and prohibits a public 
authority from interfering with this right except for reasons in accordance with the 
law and necessary in a democratic society that pertain to national security, public 
safety, the country’s economy, criminal and public health purposes, or for 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others.38  
Moreover, the Directive Articles 2, 4, 12, and 14 cover relevant definitions 
and the data subject’s right including the data subject’s right of access to data in 
three circumstances;39 the first relates to timely access and prohibits excessive 
delays, the second involves the rectification, erasure or blocking of inaccurate or 
incomplete data that does not comply with the Directive, and the third dictates the 
need to notify third parties whose data has been affected in particular circumstances 
unless impossible or involves a disproportionate effort.40 The Directive also covers 
the data subject’s right to object to the processing of personal data in a particular 
situation when justified, and the right to be informed of and object to personal data 
disclosures when the data subject’s personal data is being disclosed to or used by 
third parties for the purposes of direct marketing.41  
The right to privacy in the EU stems from a culmination of these various 
sources. The Directive highlights an individual’s right as a data subject and the 
handling of the data subject’s information. The GDPR further builds on the 
Directive, expanding the data subject’s rights while clarifying ambiguous sections. 
However, the general right to privacy is rooted in the Charter, unambiguously 
declaring privacy as an uncompromising right held by all individuals within the 
EU. The Conventions complement the Charter by providing minimum protections 
for the general right to privacy. Together, the EU’s framework for the individual’s 
right to privacy is superior to any other country or region. 
 
2. Freedom of Expression Laws 
 
                                                 
quality requires that personal information be ‘stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not 
used in a way incompatible with those purposes.’ Moreover, the concept of data quality limits the 
processing of personal data to circumstances that are ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are stored.’”). 
38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4 1950, 
E.T.S. No. 5, https://rm.coe.int/1680063765 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. 
39 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 2, 4, 12 and 14. 
40 Id. at art. 12. 
41 Id. at art. 14. 
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Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) 
is the main source of law declaring the right to freedom of expression in the EU. 
The Convention specifies that the right to freedom of expression includes the 
“freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”42 However, the right 
to freedom of expression is not limitless. As the second section of Article 10 goes 
on to state, these freedoms may be subject to conditions or restrictions under the 
law that are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity, public safety, preventing crime, protecting health, morals, 
reputation or rights of others, preventing disclosure of confidential information, and 
maintaining an impartial judiciary.43 The Article, outlining the right to freedom of 
expression, clarifies that the exercise of this freedom may be subject to necessary 
restrictions in the interest of the right to privacy “for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others” and “for the disclosure of information received in confidence.”44 
Unlike US law, European legislators and courts may interpret this law as a 
requirement to balance the right to expression with the right to privacy.  
 
E. Scholars’ Recommendations for Resolving Privacy and the Freedom of 
Expression 
 
Many scholars have provided recommendations on means to resolve 
tensions between the RTBF and the freedom of expression. Edward Lee provides 
numerous suggestions for resolving these tensions. He suggests trumping one right 
in favor of the other, but explains the potential dangers of doing so, which include 
severely limiting one right.45 He also suggests a presumption in favor of one right. 
However, when a presumption is strong, it may have the same consequence as 
trumping one right, resulting in an ineffective strategy for balancing both rights.46 
He further suggests cataloging and enumerating the outcomes of certain factual 
situations.47 While seemingly reasonable and practical, this recommendation may 
overlook important distinct circumstances. However, he further suggests that the 
enumerated factors could be considered as presumptions subject to exceptions 
                                                 
42 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, at art. 10. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Edward Lee, The Right to Be Forgotten v. Free Speech, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO SOC’Y 
85, 98-99 (2015). 
46 Id. at 100.  
47 Id. 
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which is an adequate solution that is more likely to produce fair results.48 However, 
a case-by-case assessment of the facts is still warranted in this case, and the catalog 
must be consistently updated as technology develops rapidly and increases in 
complexity. Lee ultimately recommends that Google work with policy makers to 
allow for the deletion of embarrassing photographs and expunged convictions of 
minors on social media. Recognizing similar rights for adults, Lee recommends de-
ranking search results.49 This suggestion will heavily increase the administrative 
burden and increase the number of frivolous cases. Recognizing such rights for 
adults would likely to limit access to public information and lead to unnecessary 
litigation over what constitutes an “embarrassing” photo. 
Shaniqua Singleton has suggested recommendations that can be 
implemented by the private sector.50 She states that clear standards can be set to 
inform companies when they should honor individuals’ removal requests.51 Having 
uniform standards is a practical solution, but agreeing on the standards that require 
the removal of information is difficult given the varying factual circumstances of 
each case. Also, RTEs are likely to increase significantly since individuals will no 
longer have to file suits to remove their data, imposing severe administrative 
burdens on search engines. Further, the uniform standards are likely to be broad 
and widely-applicable, thus potentially decreasing the public’s access to 
information and limiting the freedom of expression.  
Furthermore, David Hoffman, Paula Bruening, and Sophia Carter authored 
an article that deals with implementing the Google Spain decision.52 Among other 
recommendations, they suggest using six criteria to evaluate individuals’ requests 
to remove links to protect “an individual’s right to obscurity:” lapse of time, 
illegally obtained data, discrimination, sensitive data, taken out of context, and 
individual as victim.53 Although the factors approach the requests holistically, 
many factors rest on the assumption that an individual’s right to privacy is triggered 
by negative consequences arising from the publication of private information. 
However, the right to privacy is not extinguished when the publication of private 
information does not subsequently harm the individual. 
 
F. Reconciling Historical Definitions of Privacy with the Law of Privacy 
                                                 
48 Id. at 101. 
49 Id. at 110. 
50 Shaniqua Singleton, Balancing a Right to be Forgotten with a Right to Freedom of Expression 
in the Wake of Google Spain v. AEPD, 44 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 191-93 (2015). 
51 Id. 
52 David Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia Carter, The Right to Obscurity: How We Can 
Implement the Google Spain Decision, 17 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 437 (2016).  
53 Id. at 478-80.  
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To be able to understand nuances in privacy law and the contention in 
defining what is private and entitled to the RTE, a general understanding of 
conceptualizations of privacy in the legal environment is necessary. A brief 
introduction and summary comprising different understandings of the definition of 
privacy are listed below, followed by a brief and limited introduction to the history 
of privacy law as well as two prominent common law privacy concepts. 
Understanding common law privacy concepts lends to further distinguishing 
contentious areas in privacy law and helps better analyze the treatment of data 
privacy law cases.  
 
1. What is Privacy? 
 
The general view of privacy is often too limited because people tend to 
search for a core characteristic to define privacy. Many scholars have proposed such 
characteristics and other theories and criticisms associated with defining privacy.54 
To fully understand the EOE, privacy and its underlying components must be 
presented through a variety of definitions, approaches, and conceptualizations. The 
internet adds an extra layer of complexity to the task of conceptualizing privacy 
because the rapidly changing and advancing technology makes it difficult to create 
legal solutions that anticipate novel threats to privacy. Professor Paul Schwartz 
describes critical challenges and essential factors that impact privacy, particularly 
the unparalleled ways information technology and cyberspace affect individual 
self-determination and democratic deliberation.55 Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, as discussed below, argued that privacy is the right “to be let alone.”56  
The traditional and most common way to define privacy is to look at how 
the word “privacy” is used and construct a category with clear boundaries of what 
falls within and what falls outside the definition of privacy.57 This method arguably 
limits the definition of privacy as it champions a binary approach to privacy that 
does not accurately reflect complicated facts of everyday life. Another common 
understanding of privacy equates privacy with secrecy, and finds that privacy is 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008); Anita L. Allen, Coercing 
Privacy, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. 
REV. 393 (1978). 
55 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999). 
See also Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877 (2000). 
56 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890). 
57 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (2002). 
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violated when secret or concealed information is publicly disclosed.58 Control over 
personal information is another conceptualization of privacy, but it is argued to be 
too narrow and only a subset of privacy because it excludes private matters 
unrelated to personal information, such as the right to make reproductive 
decisions.59 Professor Daniel Solove argues that referring to privacy in the abstract 
is usually not useful in practice, and should be defined in particular contexts to 
make the concept digestible.60 Further, Professor Solove states that the means of 
conceptualizing privacy influences the legal solutions that are provided to solve 
specific problems.61 
 
2. History of Privacy Law 
 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis are arguably the discoverers of privacy 
law.62 In the late nineteenth century, developments in the media such as 
sensationalistic scandalous news being printed in “penny presses,” and 
instantaneous photography as a result of Kodak’s “snap camera,” quickly 
contributed to disseminating information that was generally considered private in 
the public realm.63 Warren and Brandeis authored their infamous article “The Right 
to Privacy” during this period and recognized these technological developments as 
challenges to privacy.64 In their influential article, Warren and Brandeis argued for 
a new right to privacy, because existing laws such as contract law or defamation 
law were not sufficient for protecting privacy rights.65 They further argued that the 
law should embrace and recognize the right to an “inviolate personality.”66 They 
derived a right to privacy or the right “to be let alone” from an English common 
law case called Prince Albert v. Strange.67 While the Prince Albert case centered 
on the law of confidentiality, rather than privacy, Warren and Brandeis argued that 
the law of privacy already existed, making them mere “discoverers” of privacy law, 
                                                 
58 Id. at 1105.  
59 Id. at 1110. 
60 Id. at 1154. 
61 Id. 
62 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 11 (6th ed. 2018).  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197, 211 
(1890). 
66 Id. at 205-06, 211. 
67 Id. at 195, 204. 
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rather than its inventors.68 By 1903, the courts created privacy torts tailored to the 
harms Warren and Brandeis note in their article.69 
 
3. Common Law Privacy Concepts 
 
Two common law approaches to privacy laws are first, Prosser’s privacy 
torts, which were born out of a law review article authored by William Prosser that 
built on Warren and Brandeis’ law review article, and second, the law of 
confidence, an equitable doctrine in English law that sprouted from Prince Albert, 
a case decided by the High Court of Chancery in England in 1849,70 and discussed 
in Warren and Brandeis’ article. 71  
William Prosser’s famous article, titled Privacy, contends that the law of 
privacy is based on four different types of invasion of a person’s interests.72 He 
argued that the only element privacy tort cases have in common is their effect on 
the plaintiff’s right “to be let alone,”73 and described the four privacy torts as: “1) 
intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3) publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4) appropriation, for the 
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”74 While scholars have 
responded differently to Prosser’s article,75 Prosser’s framework solidified and 
                                                 
68 Id. at 213. 
69 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 25. 
70 Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac & G 25, 1171 (1849) (holding that “the right and property of an 
author or composer of any work, whether of literature, art, or science, in such work unpublished 
and kept for his private use or pleasure, entitles the owner to withhold the same altogether, or so 
far as he may please, from the knowledge of others; and the Court will interfere to prevent the 
invasion of this right by the publication of a catalogue containing a description of such work”).  
71 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 64, at 202, 204, 208. 
72 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 See e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 991, 1000-01 (1964) (responding to Prosser’s view on privacy 
tort cases by stating “[i]n Dean Prosser’s view the interest vindicated in each of these classes of 
cases is a different one. In my view the interest protected in each is the same, it is human dignity 
and individuality, or in Warren and Brandeis’ words, ‘inviolate personality’.”); Robert C. Post, 
The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev 
957, 957 (1989) (presenting his view on the purpose or privacy torts by arguing that “the common 
law tort of invasion of privacy safeguards social norms, which he calls ‘rules of civility,’” and that 
is based on the assumption that “personality, as well as human dignity, are injured by the violation 
of these norms”); Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
Cal. L. Rev. 1887, 1922 (2010) (stating that “tort privacy became rigid and static” after Prosser).  
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organized the law of privacy in the United States, with the Restatement of Torts 
recognizing Prosser’s four torts.76  
On the other hand, the common law tort of privacy in England is rooted in 
the law of confidence which is based on the implicit contract of confidentiality.77 
The law of confidence holds “that if information is given in circumstances where it 
is expected that a duty of confidence applies, that information cannot normally be 
disclosed without the information provider’s consent.”78 Further, common law 
provides that there are three circumstances allowing the disclosure of confidential 
information: first, “where the individual to whom the information relates has 
consented,” second, “where disclosure is in the public interest,” and third, “where 
there is a legal duty to do so.”79 The breach of confidence doctrine is constantly 
changing and developing to “reflect changes in society, technology and business 
practice.”80 For a successful civil claim action of breach of confidence, the 
information has to have “the necessary degree of confidence about it, the 
information was provided in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, 
and (for an injunction of declaration to be granted), there was an unauthorized use 
or disclosure of that information and, at least, the risk of damage.”81 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
The Directive’s RTBF tensions with the freedom of expression has been 
noted and discussed widely. As a result, the GDPR aims to extinguish some 
tensions by outlining areas in which the right to privacy is unlikely to prevail in 
Article 17(3)(b-e) (the exceptions). However, some ambiguities can only be 
resolved once they are litigated in court. Below, assumptions and clarifications 
made for this Note’s purposes are explained and tensions between Article 8 and 
Article 10 of the Convention are assessed closely, followed by an analysis of the 
treatment of privacy cases by EU courts to identify important issues that determine 
what information is private and entitled to the RTE. Lastly, this Note proposes the 
EOE, a new test that courts can use to help determine whether information is private 
and entitled to the RTE in a consistent, fair, and comprehensive manner. 
                                                 
76 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 28. 
77 UK DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE COMMON LAW DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Pu
blications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/Browsable/DH_5803173 (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [2000] EWCA (Civ) J1221-14 [165], [2001] QB 967.  
81 UK HEALTH AND SAFETY EXEC., BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcementguide/court/reporting-breach.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 
2018). 
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A. Unresolved Ambiguities in Article 17 
 
There are unresolved ambiguities within Article 17 of the GDPR that will 
be challenged and clarified when the law is enforced. But to be able to suggest EOE, 
this Note presents the approach that was used to handle the vague areas within the 
law.  
 The definition of “controller” remains to be a point of contention in cases 
concerning the publishing of individual information. Article 17 starts with 
declaring the data subject’s right to the erasure of personal data from the 
“controller”.82 While a “controller” has been defined in the GDPR,83 it is not as 
clear to identify the “controller” as it would be in cases where data is systematically 
being collected by an entity for specific or general purposes. For example, prior to 
Google Spain, it was initially unclear whether Google was considered to be only a 
processor of information or a controller of information. This is significant because 
controllers have increased duties under the law. The controlling precedent in this 
area comes from the German Federal Court of Justice case of Google 
Autocomplete.84 The court held that having the plaintiff’s business name associated 
with the words “scientology” and “fraud” in Google’s “autocomplete” function 
despite no connection to fraud or scientology consisted of a personality right 
violation, and ruled that the autocomplete function was Google’s content.85 The 
court held that Google had a responsibility “to prevent their software from 
generating a result that would lead to the privacy violation” even though it was not 
required to ensure that the software and autocomplete suggestions would not violate 
privacy rights in advance.86 Based on the Google Autocomplete decision, this Note 
assumes that “controllers” are both internet search engines and individual or 
institutional publishers as the court ruled that search engines are capable of 
                                                 
82 GDPR, art. 17. (1). 
83 See GDPR, art. 4 (“‘[C]ontroller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by 
Union of Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be 
provided for by Union or Member State law.”).  
84 Bundergerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 14, 2013, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDERGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 2, 2013 (Ger.). 
85 Id. 
86 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 263.  
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producing their own content through autocomplete and algorithms.87 Consequently, 
I will extrapolate this decision and assume that controllers have the capability of 
expression since they are capable of violating privacy rights, and thus both will be 
assumed to have rights of freedom of expression.  
 Further, the publishing of private information should be given the right to 
erasure based on the individual’s right to privacy under the relevant EU law.88 The 
individual’s right to privacy under the RTE and the GDPR can be derived from 
Article 17(1)(d)-(e).89 Article 17(1)(d) states that the right of erasure is applicable 
when “the personal data have been unlawfully processed.”90 Under this definition, 
published information that has been unlawfully processed can consequently be 
deemed illegally published. Collecting information by violating an individual’s 
privacy according to any relevant EU law will subsequently be unlawfully 
processed personal data. Furthermore, Article 17(1)(e) states that “the personal data 
have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in a Union or Member 
State law to which the controller is subject.”91 This Article gives rise to the right of 
privacy under EU law and can be understood to require the GDPR RTE to comply 
with the individual’s right to privacy under EU law. 
 
B. Right to Erasure vs. Freedom of Expression 
 
 The tensions between Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) 
and Article 10 (freedom of expression) are easy to identify, yet difficult to 
reconcile.92 To what extent does erasure conflict with Article 10 of the Convention? 
Article 8 of the Convention states that a public authority shall not interfere with the 
right to respect for private and family life except when necessary in a democratic 
society and in accordance with the law. Article 8 also carves out circumstances 
when a public authority can interfere with the right to respect, including reasons for 
national security, public safety, the country’s economic well-being, crime 
prevention, health reasons, or “the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”93 Accordingly, a public authority may interfere with an individual’s 
                                                 
87 See generally German Federal Court of Justice, Liability of Search Engine Operator for 
Autocomplete Suggestions that Infringe Rights of Privacy -- "Autocomplete" Function, 8 J. OF 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRACTICE 797 (2013). 
88 See supra Section II, D.  
89 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 17(1)(d)-(e), 2016 O.J (L 119/1) 43, 44. 
90 Id. art. 17(1)(d). 
91 Id. art. 17(1)(e). 
92 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, at art. 10. 
93 Id. sec. I, art. 8. 
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exercise of the right to respect private and family life in order to explicitly protect 
freedom of expression.  
However, Article 10 of the Convention states that the exercise of the 
freedoms of expression may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions, or 
penalties, and lists the same reasons for its limitation as Article 8, and adds 
additional circumstances which include, “the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others,” and “preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence.”94 
Accordingly, the Convention has imposed more limitations on the right to freedom 
of expression than the right to privacy, and has built in privacy protections within 
Article 10 to ensure that the freedom of expression does not blatantly interfere with 
individuals’ privacy rights.  
The court in Google Spain v. AEPD ruled that Google must remove an 
individual’s private information, but did not impose the same ruling on the 
newspaper that initially published the individual’s information.95 Google removes 
the information by “delinking” or “unlinking” the newspaper’s page from its search 
results.96 This permits the removal of information without effectively “erasing” or 
“forgetting” the information, exposing the inaccurate title of Article 17. Seemingly, 
freedom of expression concerns may have influenced the court’s decision when 
they decided to limit the removal of information to Google alone, and the court may 
have intended to strike a balance between erasure and the freedom of expression.97 
 
C. Analyzing the Treatment of Data Privacy Cases by EU Courts 
 
Analyzing and assessing the EU’s treatment of privacy cases is necessary 
to suggest an effective solution. While the cases have been decided based on the 
Directive’s RTBF, the ruling will inevitably affect future decisions made under 
GDPR’s RTE. Neither the reasoning nor the outcome of the data privacy cases have 
been consistent. However, by closely analyzing factors courts deemed important, 
the recommendation will be able to reconcile the different reasoning approaches 
taken by the judges and distinguish the cases with differing outcomes. The cases 
below have been divided into categories based on the nature of the data and the 
court’s reasoning. 
 
                                                 
94 Id. sec I, art. 10. 
95 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. AEPD, 2014 E.C.R. 317, 21 (May 13, 2014). 
96 See generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion: In Europe, the right to be forgotten 
trumps the Internet, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion [https://perma.cc/2WL2-
LGN2].  
97 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2014 E.C.R. 317. 
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1. Considering the Circumstances of the Intrusion 
 
The ECtHR has considered the circumstances and places in which actions 
take place to decide whether they are in fact, private. In Von Hannover v. Germany, 
the ECtHR held that there was a violation of Article 8 of the Convention when 
German magazines published photographs of Princess Caroline engaging in private 
activities such as horseback riding, shopping, on a bicycle, and spending time with 
her children.98 The ECtHR generally concluded that the published photos related to 
her private life and did not make a contribution to a debate of general interest.99 
While the public figure in this case links to GDPR Article 17(3)(d) and the public 
interest which is outside the scope of this Note,100 this case closely deals with the 
right to privacy in the Convention and the right to respect for private and family 
life.101 In Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), the courts looked at “the 
circumstances in which the photos had been taken” as well to make their 
determination.102  
Analyzing the likely outcome of this case under common law privacy 
concepts can highlight similarities and discrepancies of different privacy laws. 
Under the English common law of confidence, Princess Caroline’s pictures would 
not be protected as there was no implied contract of confidentiality between two 
parties. Under Prosser’s torts, the pictures may be considered private under 
“intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs.”103 Had Princess 
Caroline conducted these actions in the public sphere, it is unlikely that her photos 
would be protected under the right to privacy, and it would have been more likely 
for the right to freedom of expression and information to prevail in this case.  
The ECtHR sometimes takes the role citizens play in society into 
consideration, and distinguishes between the publication of facts and rumors. In 
Mosley v. United Kingdom, the plaintiff challenged the publication of a news story 
by “News of the World” that included embarrassing sexual information regarding 
his private life and argued for imposing a legal duty to notify him prior to publishing 
                                                 
98 See Von Hannover v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"dmdocnumber":["699729"],"itemid":["001-
61853"]}[https://perma.cc/7DB3-GQ5S].  
99 Id. at 27. See also Von Hannover v. Germany (no.2), 40660/08 & 6064/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 
(2012) (holding that national courts “carefully balanced the right of the publishing companies to 
freedom of expression against the right of the applicants to respect for their private life”).  
100 GDPR, art. 17(3)(d). 
101 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, at art. 8. 
102 Von Hannover v. Germany (no.2), 40660/08 & 6064/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 (2012). 
103 Prosser, supra note 71, at 389. 
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the story.104 The ECtHR found that Article 8 of the convention did not require 
publishers to notify individuals before they published information about their 
private lives.105 Although the case involved an invasion of privacy, the court noted 
that “there is a distinction to be drawn between reporting facts—even if 
controversial—capable of contributing to a debate of general public interest in a 
democratic society, and making tawdry allegations about an individual’s private 
life.”106 This case generated a lot of media,107 and ultimately presents an example 
of the limits of the right to privacy.108 The court in this case was conscious about 
the chilling effect the right of privacy may have on free speech and refused to allow 
a notification requirement for the publication of facts.109 Although the question of 
this case was not whether the private sexual acts were considered “private,” they 
would likely be considered “private” under both Prosser’s torts and the law of 
confidence.110 
 
2. Reasonable Relationship of Proportionality 
 
The ECtHR considers and balances both the right to privacy and the right 
to freedom of expression when deciding cases, as well as the impact their decisions 
will have on these separate rights. In Axel Springer v. Germany, albeit not a RTE 
request, the court refused to provide an actor with an injunction preventing the 
                                                 
104 See Mosley v. United Kingdom, 48009/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2011), http://www.5rb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Mosley-v-UK-ECHR-Application-no-48009_08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D8QC-ZGGH].  
105 Mosley v. United Kingdom, 48009/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (2011); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY 
LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 258. 
106 Mosley v. United Kingdom, 48009/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (2011); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY 
LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 258. 
107 See e.g., Max Mosley, We Need a Law on Prior Notification, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/feb/24/privacy-law-prior-
notification [https://perma.cc/7QPC-GDQM]; Tom Wells, Mosley Takes a Proper Spanking, SUN 
(May 10, 2011), https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/536321/mosley-takes-a-proper-
spanking/ [https://perma.cc/4VSQ-QWRX].  
108 See generally Case of Mosley v. The United Kingdom, Global Freedom of Expression, COLUM. 
UNIV. (last visited Apr. 7, 2018), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/case-
mosley-v-united-kingdom/ [https://perma.cc/4YAV-9SHJ]. 
109 Mosley v. United Kingdom, 48009/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 774 (2011). 
110 Prosser, supra note 71, at 389; The Common Law Duty of Confidentiality, UK Department of 
Health (last visited Apr. 7, 2018), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Pu
blications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/Browsable/DH_5803173 [https://perma.cc/DV7S-
TPWZ]. 
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publication of information regarding his drug-related offense.111 The court held that 
“there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between, on the one hand, 
the restrictions imposed by the national courts on the applicant company’s right to 
freedom of expression, and on the other hand, the legitimate aim pursued.”112 In the 
case that convictions are regularly made public, removing information from public 
access or preventing its publication is only limiting free speech because the 
individual does not initially have a right to privacy regarding publications of 
information regarding public safety or national security according to Article 8 of 
the Convention.113 
 
3. The Nature of Publicly Available Information 
 
 In some cases, the nature of the private information bears heavier weight in 
the court decisions, even when the information is already publicly-available. This 
usually diminishes the chances that the information is characterized as “private.” In 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland,114 a publisher 
published individuals’ publicly-available tax-related data.115 The court held that 
“extensive publication of personal, publicly-available tax information constituted a 
violation of Article 8, especially in light of Article 10’s protection of a free 
press.”116 However, this information will not be covered under both the law of 
confidence nor under Prosser’s torts despite its private nature because they were 
publicly available. 
 
4. Private Information in the Public Sphere 
 
 Information in the public domain or that is widely-known is regularly 
treated differently by the court, even when it is usually considered private. In 
Lindqvist, a woman published extensive information about her work colleagues, 
including their names, hobbies, family circumstances, phone numbers, and other 
personal information, such as details regarding a colleague’s injury on a webpage, 
                                                 
111 Axel Springer v. Germany, 39954/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34 (2012), 
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CASE-OF-AXEL-
SPRINGER-AG-v.-GERMANY.pdf [https://perma.cc/B58X-BMPL]. 
112 Id. 
113 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, art. 8. 
114 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, 931/13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2015), 
https://lovdata.no/static/EMDN/emd-2013-000931-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PM6-EVEC]. 
115 Id.; SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 259. 
116 Id. 
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that could be accessed from her Church’s home page.117 The purpose was 
charitable, and aimed to enable parishioners to easily obtain information.118 The 
woman removed the information once her colleagues voiced their objections. 
Despite doing so, she was charged with criminal violations of Swedish data 
protection law.119 However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that her 
activities did not fall within the scope of the Directive and were not a 
disproportionate violation of the freedom of expression.120 This case would not be 
covered under Prosser’s torts because this information is likely to be viewed as 
public facts as a large number of people are aware of the facts surrounding these 
individuals and the facts are in the public domain. However, parts of this 
information such as the parishioners’ family circumstances and phone numbers and 
the colleague’s injury may be covered under the law of confidence since the 
information was provided with an expectation that it would remain confidential. 
 
D. The Elements of Erasure 
 
As explained above, both Prosser’s privacy torts and the law of confidence 
can be used to determine whether published material is private and is entitled to the 
right to erasure. However, solely adhering to these concepts of privacy in the 
context of publishing private information as freedom of expression and information 
will limit the concept of privacy, and in some circumstances unnecessarily expand 
it. However, placing blanket-definitions over the concept of privacy will limit the 
freedom of expression and information.  
Both Prosser’s privacy torts and the law of confidence cannot be used to 
identify private information in this context. Prosser’s torts overwhelmingly focus 
on private information that result in negative consequences. Prosser’s first element 
is covered by Article 8 of the Convention.121 Further, Prosser’s second and third 
elements may have negative effects on public interest and the freedom of 
expression, and Prosser’s fourth element is now covered by libel, defamation, and 
intellectual property law.122 Additionally, the law of confidence protects an 
overwhelmingly large amount of information by protecting both private and non-
                                                 
117 Case C101/01, Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, ¶ 17. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=47672&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=156834.  
118 Id. 
119 Laraine Laudati, Summaries of EU Court Decisions Relating to Data Protection 2000-2015, 
OLAF, (Jan. 28, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/caselaw_2001_2015_en.pdf. 
120 Id. at 45. 
121 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 37, at art. 8. 
122 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
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private confidential information. This too may have unintended negative impacts 
on public interest and the freedom of expression and information.  
As a result, this Note proposes the elements of erasure (EOE); the elements 
consider whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether there was 
a reasonable expectation of a duty of confidence, how the information was 
collected, and whether an individual is personally identifiable using the collected 
information. The EOE is a balancing test that takes into consideration 
comprehensive factors that should be assessed to determine whether published 
information is considered private information. If the information is private, a 
determination should be made on whether it is entitled to the right to erasure (RTE). 
Otherwise, it would be considered an exercise of the right of freedom of expression 
and information.  
The following balancing test aims to reconcile the aforementioned cases and 
provide courts with a consistent approach to analyze and determine the sufficiency 
of RTE requests. The EOE aim to clarify what falls under the right of privacy and 
is entitled to the RTE when the individual case does not neatly fall under one of the 
subsections of Article 17(1). However, this balancing test is irrelevant when Article 
17(3)(b)-(e) (RTE exceptions) are clearly applicable.123 Article 17(3)(d) is 
particularly problematic and is often intertwined with cases that discuss the RTE 
versus the right of freedom of expression and information. Nonetheless, it is a 
separate argument outside the scope of this Note, and this Note aims to distinguish 
freedom of expression cases from public interest cases to the utmost extent possible. 
 
1. Was There a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? 
 
 First, the court must ask whether there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the case of the information published. Whether the actions were 
conducted in public and whether they concern private and family life, as outlined 
in Convention’s Article 8, are included within this element. In P.G. & J.H. v. United 
Kingdom, while not directly relevant to the topic, the court stated that a factor that 
affects Article 8’s protection of private life “outside a person’s home or private 
premises” is “a person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy.”124 In Mosley v. 
United Kingdom, Mosley was a public individual with a famous name and family 
                                                 
123 See GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17. 
124 P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, 44787/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, 
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2017, supra note 28, at 258. 
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history, and could be argued to have a lower expectation of privacy.125 Additionally, 
in Satakunnan, the court found that an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy regarding their tax information.126  
This element must allow for a comprehensive view of the facts. For 
example, this element would hold that a President does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding their tax-related information based on their public 
role in society, yet a private individual would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy concerning the same information. Moreover, in Von Hannover (no.2), the 
court stated that the circumstances in which the photos were taken were relevant.127 
Individuals are unlikely to have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are 
expressing themselves outwardly in the public sphere that a casual observer would 
notice. However, a person does not expect that a stranger might be chronicling their 
exact moves in public, nor does a person expect to be “upskirted” in public. 
Consequently, an expectation of privacy may still exist in the public sphere, but a 
comprehensive view of the facts is imperative.  
 
2. Was there a Reasonable Expectation of a Duty of Confidence? 
 
 Second, the court must ask whether there was a reasonable expectation of a 
duty of confidence. This factor stems from the English law of confidence with an 
added element of reasonableness. Questioning whether a reasonable expectation of 
this duty exists is necessary because without it, the English common law is 
overbroad and protects both private and non-private information. Warren and 
Brandeis initially published their infamous article when cameras became a 
commodity and capturing faces and everyday scenes was unprecedented.128 
Technology has rapidly developed since then and as a consequence, our 
expectations of privacy have decreased. The duty of confidence holds where a 
reasonably prudent person would expect an implied contract of confidentiality 
taking into consideration general circumstances surrounding the case. Further, 
identical to the English law, this Note proposes that the three circumstances that 
allow the disclosure of confidential information should remain unchanged: first, 
where the individual to whom the information related has consented; second, where 
                                                 
125 Max Mosley: Life in the Fast Lane, BBC (May 10, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
13338571. 
126 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, 931/13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015). 
127 Von Hannover v. Germany No.2, 40660/08 & 6064/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012). 
128 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)., 
https://www.engineersgarage.com/invention-stories/camera-history 
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disclosure is in the public interest (which will be left for courts and legislators to 
define) and third, where there is a legal duty to do so.129  
 This element focuses on the relationships between the parties involved in 
the transfer of information. For example, in Mosley v. United Kingdom, Mosley had 
a reasonable expectation of a duty of confidence between himself and the other 
party in his sexual encounter because an individual reasonably expects intimate 
sexual acts to remain confidential.130 However, in a case like Bodil Lindqvist, a 
court would probably find that individuals should not have a reasonable expectation 
of a duty of confidence regarding general information they voluntarily provided 
about themselves.131 Yet, the court might find that a reasonable expectation of a 
duty of confidence exists if one of Lindqvist’s work colleagues shared sensitive 
family circumstances with her, especially if they maintained a close relationship 
built on trust. 
 
3. How was the Information Collected? 
 
 Third, the courts must look at the means used to collect private information, 
which is increasingly complex and always important given the state of the internet 
and surrounding technologies. This factor also aims to address issues in Von 
Hannover and paparazzi and tabloids in general, as well as what this Note terms 
“second-hand publishing.” When paparazzi are excessively intrusive and do not 
respect individuals’ private life, home, and correspondence in accordance with the 
Convention Article 8,132 then the information is more likely to be labeled as private 
information. Also, if the information is already in the public sphere or made public 
by the individual via a blog and a publisher who has access to this information 
chooses to publish the information second-hand, it is less likely to be considered 
private information.  
 This element focuses on the source of the information and the means used 
to access the information. For example, if the paparazzi were intrusive in obtaining 
Princess Caroline’s pictures in Von Hannover v. Germany, or accessed her home 
or communications illegally, this would constitute a violation of the right to privacy 
and find that the information was obtained improperly.133 However, in Oy v. 
Finland, the tax-related data was already publicly-available, and the publisher only 
                                                 
129 See discussion supra Part II.F.3.  
130 Mosley v. United Kingdom, 48009/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (2011).  
131 Case C-101/01, Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971.  
132 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8. 
133 Von Hannover v. Germany, 59320/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34-35 (2004). 
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engaged in “second-hand publishing.”134 Overall, the information may still be 
considered private under the first EOE because there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy associated with tax-related data due to its sensitive nature, and the publisher 
may have increased access to the information or harmed the individual by 
aggregating the data in one location. However, under the third EOE, the tax-related 
data was not obtained through intrusion or illegal methods. 
 
4. Is an Individual Personally Identifiable Using the Disclosed 
Information?  
 
Fourth, the court must determine whether an individual is personally 
identifiable using the disclosed information. In some cases, such as an 
autobiography that details the life of another person whose identity is not crucial 
for public interest reasons or otherwise, or a news story about a rare disease that 
does not require divulging personal identities, and so on, private information should 
not act as a hindrance to the disclosure of the information. However, the identity of 
the individual should consistently be protected when private information that could 
be deemed otherwise useful and should not be restricted is divulged. In these cases, 
information should be disclosed provided that it is not traceable to the individual 
related to the data. Professor Daniel Solove states that the use of pseudonyms or 
initials are a workable compromise in such contexts and states that, “[j]ournalists 
generally do not include the names of rape victims or whistleblowers in their 
stories. On television, the media sometimes obscures the faces of particular people 
in video footage. With minimal effort, the media can report stories and also protect 
privacy.”135 
This element aims to ensure that the freedom of expression is not stifled due 
to privacy concerns. For example, in Bodil Lindqvist, merely removing an 
individual’s name is insufficient because the individuals remain personally 
identifiable through their home addresses, telephone numbers, and other identifying 
information provided on the site.136 However, if a publisher blurred out the faces 
and obscured any identifying elements connected to individuals pictured around a 
crime scene, the individuals will likely no longer be personally identifiable. These 
actions can be sufficient to avoid interfering with an individual’s right to privacy. 
 
 
                                                 
134 Oy v. Finland, 931/13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52, 55-56 (2015). 
135 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53 Duke L.J. 967, 1021 (2003).  
136 Lindqvist, supra note 130. 
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E. Applying the Elements of Erasure to Google Spain v. AEPD 
 
To illustrate the application of the EOE factors, this Note will apply them 
to Google Spain v. AEPD. First, was there a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
One can argue that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because real 
estate auctions are often published in the media and the real estate auction was a 
public affair. However, in this particular case, the announcement was published, 
mentioned the individual’s name, and detailed that the real estate auction was 
conducted for the recovery of social-security debts which could be argued to exceed 
the information needed to publicize a real estate auction. Additionally, if the court 
were to find that most auction sellers are anonymous, this would strengthen the 
individual’s expectation of privacy. Second, was there a reasonable expectation of 
a duty of confidence? This factor is not prevalent in this case as we do not have 
enough information regarding the people the information was shared with. Third, 
how was the information collected? Google Spain’s algorithm linked to La 
Vanguardia newspaper. Consequently, the information was collected appropriately, 
meaning that this factor does not weigh in favor of the RTE. Fourth, is the 
individual personally identifiable using the disclosed information? In this case, the 
individual was clearly personally identifiable; his name, Costeja Gonzalez, 
alongside information regarding his debts were publicized. The fourth factor 
strongly weighs in favor of the RTE in this case, especially since publicizing his 
personal information is not central to the real estate auction purposes. Overall, the 
deciding factor may hinge on whether the court finds that there was a reasonable 
expectation to privacy. Consequently, using the EOE, a court will likely find that 
Mr. Gonzalez is entitled to the RTE.  
This case lies on the fringes of the right to privacy, explaining the highly 
controversial ruling of the case. Nonetheless, the EOE balancing test provides a 
consistent method to evaluate RTE requests by distilling haphazardly-decided 
privacy cases into four central elements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the RTE supports the erasure of published personal data that 
has been unlawfully processed. Under EU law, an explicit right to privacy exists 
under GDPR Article 17. To adequately determine whether individual cases are 
entitled to erasure due to a privacy violation, the EOE present factors that enable a 
court to comprehensively evaluate privacy rights in relation to the right to freedom 
of expression in this particular context. Additional research should be conducted to 
further distinguish the RTE’s treatment of traditional controllers (e.g., online 
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magazines) from untraditional controllers (e.g., search engines). This can be done 
once the GDPR is enforced and courts issue rulings that provide an indication of 
how, if at all, different controllers should be distinguished under the law in this 
context. Nevertheless, the EOE balancing test equips the courts with a 
straightforward method to evaluate and protect the right to privacy without 
unnecessarily limiting the freedom of expression and information.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
GDPR Article 17 “Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”137 
 
(1) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay 
and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data 
without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies:  
a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; 
b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is 
based according to point (a) or Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 
9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing;  
c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) 
and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or 
the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); 
d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed;  
e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal 
obligation in Union of Member State law to which the controller is 
subject;  
f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of 
information society services referred to in Article 8(1). 
(2) Where the controller has made the personal data public and is 
obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the 
controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of 
implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical 
measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal 
data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such 
controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal 
data.  
(3)  Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that processing is 
necessary:  
 a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information; 
 b) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing 
by Union or Member State law to which the controlled is subject or 
for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest of in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; 
 c) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in 
accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as Article 
9(3); 
 d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance 
                                                 
137 See GDPR, supra note 2, at art. 17. 
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with Article 89(1) in so far as the right referred to in paragraph 1 is 
likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of 
the objectives of that processing; or 
 e) for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims. 
 
 
